U.S. Agricultural Assistance to Bolivia

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U.S. Agricultural Assistance to Bolivia began in 1942 and, for its first three decades, was largely based on the Bohan Plan. The 1942 report ignored the fact that the majority of the population resided in the Andean highlands, and instead looked to the sparsely populated east as the economic development hope of the nation. It called for large scale industrial agricultural development in the Eastern lowlands, centered around the city of Santa Cruz. Following the report's completion, the first priority was a highway connecting Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, which would connect this future hub of economic and agricultural activity with the population centers in the west.[1] Among other things, agricultural exports would improve the nation's balance of payments.

U.S. Assistance Before and After the 1952 Revolution

The first decades of U.S. assistance were interrupted by political turmoil and the 1952 Bolivian revolution. However, the U.S. became a strong partner of the revolutionary government.

Research

In 1942, U.S. agricultural assistance began with a research program located in the Amazon focused on improving rubber production (a material badly needed by the U.S. for its war effort). In 1943, another agreement was signed between the two nations' governments for a program of agricultural development. On the U.S. side, the USDA was designated as the implementing agency. However, due to political turmoil in Bolivia, implementation did not begin until 1947, when a three-man party headed by Dr. Olen E. Leonard of USDA, Nicario C'de Baca, a special­ist in extension, and Floyd R. Oliver, an agronomist, began research work in the Cochabamba valley at the Tamborada Experiment Station.[2] This was followed in 1948 with new research efforts located at Belen on the Altiplano and Saavedra in the Santa Cruz area.

On November 30, 1948, the Bolivian government issued Supreme Decree 1401 officially creating SAI (Servicio Agricola Interamericano) as a special entity within the Ministry of Agriculture. SAI was divided into: administrative, agricultural economics, agricultural research, agricultural extension, agricultural machinery, and supervised credit.[3] Between 1946 and 1962, the U.S. gave assistance to 14 research stations, and of them, three were located in the Altiplano, one in Yungas, two in the valleys, and the remaining eight were in the lowlands (Beni, Santa Cruz, and the Amazon). In the Altiplano, the research stations focused on potatoes, wheat, sheep, forages, vegetables, and quinoa. In Yungas, the focus was on citrus and rice. In the valleys, potatoes and wheat. In the Amazon, rubber. And in the lowlands of Beni and Santa Cruz, they focused on beef, cattle pastures, rice, sugar cane, corn, and rubber.[4]

Extension

Another area of focus was on agricultural extension. Lawrence C. Heilman, who served as a Junior Officer and later a Loan Officer in the USAID Mission to Bolivia from March 1967 through March 1969, wrote:

"The effectiveness of the Agricultural Extension Service was limited by the fact that the program had been initiated in pre-Revolutionary Bolivia when the target population was the patron or overseer of the large agricultural estate. After the Revolution of 1952, the program to be effective had to reach out to a dramatically different clientele, the Indian, the campesino. It was only natural that the campe­sino should initially look on SAI personnel with suspicion. Negative attitudes of SAI personnel, both U.S. and Bolivian, regarding the campesino population, also acted as a constraint to effective communication with this population."[5]

The revolutionary government redistributed land, breaking up the old haciendas in 1953, and giving the land to the peasants who worked it. Following the land reform, many of the extension agents were sons or daughters of families whose land had been taken, and their attitude toward those who had received it made extension work challenging.[6]

Heilman wrote that working with the overseer of large haciendas was easier for extension agents, both because they were less numerous than the 300,000 new farms created by the land reform, and because the overseers attitudes toward hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilizer, and pesticides were different from that of the campesino. He wrote:

"It was much easier to reach the owners or overseers of the large farming operations of pre-Revolu­tionary Bolivia than to reach the hundreds of thousands of campesinos after the Revolution of 1952 and the Agrarian Reform Decree of 1953. Not only was it necessary to deliver the new technology, but it was also critical to recognize the difference of attitude between the patron of a large rural estate, who was enlightened and anxious to accept new tech­nology, when compared with the campesino, who because of a lack of education and his need to practice survival agriculture, was not a risk taker."[7]

Heilman also found distribution challenging following agrarian reform. In the past, hacienda overseers would simply bring their products to nearby commercial centers but with land controlled by peasants, "the entire marketing system broke down, as did the system for delivery and selling of the farm produce to the commercial centers."[8]

Early "Successes"

By the 1960's, the U.S. named one of its top successes as the introduction of the Zebu variety of cattle to the eastern lowlands (Beni and Santa Cruz). As of 2011, these two departments account for the majority of Bolivia's beef production - and plenty of deforestration as well. By the mid-1950s, the U.S. had also introduced Cuban yellow corn, a hybrid variety capable of absorbing large amounts of fertilizer and yielding 40 bushels per acre, compared with 13 bushels per acre from native ("criollo") varieties. "By 1970 Cuban Yellow corn was the second most important crop in the Santa Cruz area." It was used as both human food and cattle feed.[9]

Rice "self-sufficiency" was achieved by 1967. (Note that rice is an urban and upper/middle class food, not commonly eaten or grown by indigenous peasants.) An estimated 90 percent of all rice grown originated from the Saavedra Research Station.[10] Sugar, also an urban food, was another focus. Improved varieties were released in 1956 and "self-sufficiency" was achieved by 1964.[11]

Of the initial successes, few came from the Altiplano. Research was done on potatoes, but the increase in potato production that occurred as attributed to "changes in agronomic practices introduced by Peace Corps volunteers" and not SAI research.[12]

Assistance in the 1960s

Development aid continued during the 1960s, but it was in a different from compared to the previous two decades. These were the years of John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress.[13]

Changes in 1958

By 1958, SAI had 793 Bolivian employees and 52 U.S. advisors. Of the Bolivians on staff, 93 had received training paid for by the U.S. government either in the U.S. or other Latin American nations. However, the U.S. judged its work so far to have suffered from "elitism."

"The basic difficulty in this U.S. agricultural assist­ ance effort in Bolivia was the inability of the U.S. develop­ment manager and technician to recognize the need to be a catalyst in the development of an indigenous institutional capability. The U.S. advisors came with much technical know­how and many of the right ideas to address the technical agricultural problems at hand, but too often they did the work themselves, employing North American technical gadgetry and lavish financial resources. The U.S. advisors did not recognize the need to develop a Bolivian institutional frame­work that would live beyond the time that U.S. resources would no longer be available."[14]

For this reason, in 1958, USAID reduced SAI's budget and instructed that it should be turned over to the Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture. However, as it had developed outside of the usual Bolivian system, SAI found little support among the Bolivian government. In the following years, "the system that SAI had established all but collapsed." Many of its experts left to find higher paying work elsewhere. What remained did so due to continued support from USAID.[15]

The Focus Shifts to the Altiplano

In the 1960s, the emphasis moved from the eastern lowlands to the Altiplano and valleys "with particular emphasis placed on providing training for campe­sino leaders at the training-facilities" located at the Belen (northern altiplano, 3,880 above sea level), Patacamaya (southern altiplano, 3,789m), Toralapa (Cochabamba, 3,595m) and Saavaedra (Santa Cruz, 450m) research stations. That is not to say the Eastern lowlands were abandoned by the development efforts, but rather "In terms of the allocation of resources to support research and demonstration centers there was a more balanced program between the Oriente [East] and the Altiplano."[16] According to Heilman's assessment:

"By the end of the sixties, the USAID Mission to Bolivia had made a reasonable transition from one that initially provided all of the resources for research and extension activity including the money, the ideas, and U.S. technical and administrative leadership to a development assistance program that was working with the Ministry of Agriculture with the Ministry taking the lead. When contrasted with the fifties, the significant difference was the style of the assistance. What had been paternalistic became cooperative with an emphasis on the development of indigenous institu­tional capability."[17]

Of the original fourteen research stations, the eight that were still funded included three in the Altiplano (north, central, and south), on in Cochabamba (valley), one in Yungas, and three in the lowlands (Beni, Santa Cruz, and the Amazon). In the Altiplano, research focused on forages, small grains, vegetables, potatoes, alpaca, sheep, and llama. In Cochabamba, the focus was potatoes. In Yungas, rice, hogs, and citrus. In the Santa Cruz, it was rice, corn, forages, sugar, cattle. In the Amazon, rubber, cacao, pepper, "other tree crops." And in the Beni plains, it was cattle and forages.[18]

Studies and Analysis in the 1960s

Several studies and analyses of Bolivian agriculture and development priorities took place during the 1960s. These included:

Several of these reports were found to be of limited usefulness, although the 1963 report was used to some degree. The 1965 report found that "there is a ready market for the wool of the llama, alpaca, and sheep of the Altiplano. It is only recently that any of this wool has found its way into Conventional Markets."[19] This report "emmphasized the importance of promoting private sector involvement in the agriculture area with the need for the Bolivian Government to take the lead in creating a favorable environment for private investment. The report also anticipated the need for marketing analysis.[20]

Green Revolution Wheat in Bolivia

Elsewhere in the world, the U.S. government was heavily promoting Green Revolution varieties of wheat developed by Norman Borlaug. Bolivia was not immune from this. While there were some wheat programs in Bolivia in the 1950s, they resulted in only a small increase in production. The Bolivian government hoped that boosting wheat production could reduce or eliminate the need for imports. Bolivian flour consumption grew from 106,000 metric tons in 1951 to 174,000 metric tons in 1972. Meanwhile, between 1963 and 1967, production actually dropped from 55,000 metric tons to 27,000 metric tons, a drop due to land devoted to wheat falling at a much faster pace than yields rose. Total production reached 57,000 metric tons in 1973, exceeding the total 1963 production but doing so on less than two-thirds as much land.[21]

During this time, Utah State University provided technical assistance on behalf of the U.S. government. They imported wheat varieties from every major wheat production area in the world. The varieties were tested and the most promising were sent for regional testing in Bolivia's wheat producing areas: Cochabamba, Potosi, Tarija, Chuquisaca, and the lowlands of Santa Cruz. The best varieties were multiplied and distributed to farmers.

Fertilizer research and soil testing were each considered "integral parts" of the Utah State University program. Also important was the Bolivian seed program, dating back to 1961. "In 1969, Utah State University included in its technical assistance team a seed advisor, and by Ministrial Resolution in 1970 the Seed Certification Division was created within the Ministry of Agriculture. This division operated as a national seed council and was charged with developing a national capability for providing and delivering certified seed to producers."[22]

Heilman reflects that the wheat program had several shortcomings during the 1960s. Among them he lists lacking funds to "establish a quality research organization," and the lack of: cooperative organizations to promote wheat produc­tion, credit for small farmers, price supports of some kind to make wheat cultivation more attractive to farmers, irrigation (in the Eastern lowlands), and storage facilities. The government also had no program to improve the skillset of its own employees, which "acted as a brake on wheat p 7oduction in Bolivia."[23]

For more information on related wheat efforts elsewhere in the world, see the article on Wheat Breeding in the Green Revolution.

Land Titling Efforts

Under Bolivia's 1953 Agrarian reform, 185,000 peasant families (45% of rural families) received a total of 263,000 titles for 3.8 million hectares of arable land by 1968. On average, families received 20.5 hectares each. However, some 300,000-350,000 peasant families, by 1968, still lacked titles to the land they claimed.[24] "The USAID Mission argued that the campesino needed a clear title to his land so that he would be willing to make capital improvements to this land. These capital improvements in turn, it was believed, would lead to greater productivity on the part of the campesino."[25]

A study by the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin, completed in 1964 and financed by USAID, recommended helping distribute titles to the 55 percent of Bolivian families who held land but lacked titles.[26] Without a title, one cannot obtain credit, nor can one pay a property tax.[27] Additionally, as noted above, a family might hesitate to undertake capital improvements on a property to which their land tenure is not secure. Aside from this, the unresolved land issues were a source of conflict:

"There were numerous efforts by former landlords to intimidate campesinos in an effort to regain possession of their former holdings. Landlords were also known to have attempted to receive payment for their lands; they had even attempted to reestablish traditional labor arrangements. There were also attempts on the part of the campesino unions to employ pressure tactics to intimidate or force landlords to abandon or sell land to which the land owners still had legal right."[28]

Beginning in 1968, the U.S. funded Bolivia's mobile "land reform brigades," each made up of a judge, eight surveyor, a secretary, an inspector, and a campesino. The funding continued until 1972, at which time approximately 300,000 titles had been processed.[29]

Sheep, Llamas, and Alpacas

Beginning in 1962, USAID began a program to increase productivity of sheep, llama, and alpaca products. This program had five major components, including water resources development, breed improvement, feed production, herd management, and marketing. As with many other USAID projects in Bolivia, Utah State University was in charge of implementation.

According to Heilman:

"The sheep flocks had been built up from strays from the sheep flocks brought from Spain as early as the sixteenth century. These flocks had suffered severe degeneration over the last 400 years as a result of natural selection which allowed undesirable genetic characteristics to persist. Consequently a large percentage of the sheep fleeces were contaminated with kemp or course hair."[30]

One of the efforts was focused on the development of an "improved" sheep breed, which was then distributed to campesinos. Another focused on improving sheep forage and alfalfa. Initially, "improved" seeds were distributed to campesinos but ultimately the responsibility for seed migrated to the private sector. The program also sought to create livestock associations which could access credit on behalf of its campesino members.

Colonization of the East

The eastern lowlands of Bolivia, largely unoccupied at the start of U.S. development efforts, have been compared to America's old wild west.[31] Heilman, who calls his chapter on the colonization of the east "development without equity" says:

"The colonization program and related activity designed to support the development of the Oriente, discussed in this chapter, represent a major development expenditure of the Bolivian and U.S. Governments. The projects described in this chapter contributed to the opening of the Orlente and signifi­cantly increased the agricultural capacity of Bolivia. How­ever, as we shall see, the increased agricultural capacity did not benefit the majority rural population on the Altiplano and in the high valleys. The colonization program is one more example of the U.S. Government's propensity to support a development philosophy that was to run contrary to the basic tenets of the Revolution of 1952 which was to support the majority population in its development."[32]

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References

  1. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 58-59.
  2. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 65-66.
  3. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 66.
  4. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 69.
  5. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 70.
  6. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 71.
  7. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 72.
  8. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 72-73.
  9. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 74.
  10. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 74-75.
  11. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 75.
  12. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 76.
  13. ↑ Alliance for Progress, U.S. State Department, Accessed April 21, 2012.
  14. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 77.
  15. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 78-79.
  16. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 80-81.
  17. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 80.
  18. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 81.
  19. ↑ USAID Mission to Bolivia, "Task Force Report on the Bolivian Agriculture Program" (April 1965), p. 6.
  20. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 84.
  21. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 87-89.
  22. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 88.
  23. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 89-90.
  24. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 233.
  25. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 228.
  26. ↑ Land Tenure Center, "Preliminary Project Proposal: A Study of the Bolivian Land Reform: Its Antecedents and Result­ ant Social, Political and Economic Change" submitted by Ronald J. Clark to the Land Tenure Center (Madison, Wisconsin Univer­sity, July 1965).
  27. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 235-36.
  28. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 238.
  29. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 236 and 240.
  30. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 242 and 240.
  31. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 116.
  32. ↑ Lawrence C. Heilman, U.S. Development Assistance to Rural Bolivia, 1941-1974: The Search for Development Strategy, PhD Thesis, American University, 1982, p. 117.

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